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ABSTRACT
A two sector general equilibrium model  is  developed in which households
can influence  the  government's choice of  the relative price  of traded goods
and the  level of public goods  supplied to each sector.  The model  is used to
illustrate key problems addressed by the political economy literature,
modeling issues  that arise,  and the nature of insights  that can be  obtained
that traditional approaches  cannot discern.
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I.  Introduction
Capital accumulation and technological change  in human, bio-physical,
and mechanical capital, combined with the efficient allocation of resources
to meet final demands, remain virtually unchallenged in economic thought as
the keys  to economic growth.  In much of  the analysis of these  issues
collective action, via the  state,  is  restricted to  two  roles:  addressing the
presence of market failures  and achieving distributive justice.  Until
fairly recently, the behavior of governments  in fulfilling these roles has
been incorporated into economic models  largely in the form of benevolent
activity  to correct market failures, and  to redistribute income  using
instruments designed to have minimal effects  on efficiency.
It  now is becoming apparent that these traditional neoclassical views
alone cannot provide adequate descriptive  insight into  the process of
attaining economic growth and distributive justice, nor  can they meet the
challenge of providing prescriptive guidance to  their attainment.  It is
well-known that governments use policy instruments that distort their
economies and are wasteful of resources.  Traditional models have difficulty
addressing questions concerning why countries persist in their pursuit of
policies  that yield an inefficient allocation of resources and exacerbate
adjustments to  external shocks.  Are  these interventions  the result of
policy mistakes?  If this  is  so, why have countries failed to  learn from
their mistakes?
A partial explanation is  that policies are the  outcome of political
pressure  exerted by domestic interest groups.  These  groups seek to  achieve
outcomes that provide  them with some advantage, but which may be socially
wasteful.  This explanation has been forwarded under the rubric of-models of
"rent seeking"  (Krueger).  The  rent seeking literature has focused on a
variety of sources of "government failure"  and the social costs imposed
when, acting in their own self-interest, individuals  seek a differential
economic advantage through collective  action and the power of  the state.
This  recognition of rent seeking behavior and its  costs has led some
1Other labels are  "directly unproductive profit seeking activity" (Bhagwati)
or more generally "political economy"  (Colander).analysts to conclude that government activity should be severely restricted.
For example, Buchanan (p.14) states:
"As long as  governmental action is restricted largely, if not entirely,
to  the protection of  individual rights, person and property and enforcing
voluntarily negotiated private contracts, the market process dominates
economic behavior and ensures  that any economic rents that appear will be
dissipated by the  force of competitive entry."
However, this view may be excessively narrow, since  it  does not ascribe
legitimate concern to  the market failures or distributional justice which
provide a rationale for collective action.  Perhaps more rich in its
implications for policy analysis  is  the view that societies are faced with a
trade-off between the  need to  redress  the market failures and unfairness
inevitably associated with market economies,  and the  fact that the means by
which to do so  inevitably admit manipulation of the rent-seeking sort.  As
with productive efficiency in input use, societies are challenged to achieve
institutional  efficiency,  i.e.,  to  design  public  institutions  which  identify
and resolve problems created by market failures and injustice in ways  that
minimize that sacrifice of economic efficiency.
In this  paper we seek to provide an introduction to recent work in this
area.  However, this  is not a literature review.  Rather, following a brief
perspective on the  scope  of the governance  literature, we forward a simple
general equilibrium model  in which agents  can influence government policy.
The model serves to  illustrate key problems addressed by the political
economy literature,  the modeling issues that arise, and the kinds of
insights  that can be  obtained that traditional approaches cannot discern.
Then, using this  structure, we attempt to  tie  together selected issues
addressed in the literature  that concern foreign trade, voting, bureaucracy,
coalition formation and the  free rider problem, and endogenous economic
growth.  Clearly, within the confines  of this paper we can only sketch some
of the essential elements of  these additional considerations.  Since the
formal approaches to political economic behavior are necessarily
abstractions of complex social systems,  their acceptability may not evolve
around whether they true or false depictions of reality.  Instead, as
Aumanns  (p. 37)  remarks in his discussion of game theory,  "we cannot ask, is
it right or  is  it wrong?  Rather, we must ask, how often has it been useful?
how useful has  it been?"  It  is in this  spirit that we proceed.
4II. Relation to Literature
The breadth of the  literature on political economy depends on whether
the  topic  is narrowed to  formal mathematical models  or broadened to  include
the numerous non mathematical contributions of, for example, Parsons, Holt
and Turner, Bates  and others  that have studied the relationships between
economics, polity and political structures.  We provide a brief overview by
selecting only representative or  leading contemporary contributions from
four different schools, namely, (i) collective  choice,  (ii)  public choice,
(iii)  political  science and  (iv)  international  trade and regulation.
The  important contribution of the  collective choice  school lies  in the
recognition that group behavior is way of aggregating individual
preferences,  that a coalition  is an organization that devises rules
governing member behavior, and the  organization consumes resources.  Olson
concludes  that broad based coalitions  are likely to  pressure governments  to
intervene in ways  that are  less wasteful  of resources than are narrow based
coalitions.  And, stable societies  are likely to  accumulate more coalitions
over time with the result that policy decisions are made more slowly, thus
slowing down society's capacity to  introduce technical change, adapt to
shocks  and to  decrease a country's  rate of economic growth.
Bates, reflecting the political  science view, draws on coalitions to
2 explain economic policy in a broader context.  He suggests  that the
interests of urban consumers in developing countries coincide with those of
domestic industrialists who view low-priced food as  serving to  decrease the
pressure on wages.  At the  same time, the rural sector is highly diversified
and, for reasons of free riding, organization and information costs, it  is
willing to expend fewer resources  to  influence policy than is  the urban
sector.  The outcome is policies which tend to  support import  substitution,
industrialization and low cost food to urban households.  The same argument
applies  to  developed economies where the food share of the consumer's budget
is  small, so  that consumers are  less willing to  expend resources to
influence food prices.  Agriculture becomes a smaller component in the
economy, farms tend to be more specialized so  that income becomes sensitive
to commodity policy.  Within their area of specialization, farmers also face
lower organizational costs because of the relative ease of overcoming the
2The  literature on voting and economic policy is briefly discussed in
Section VII.free rider problem compared to urban groups.  The result  is  that agriculture
receives protection relative to  the industrial sector.3
The public choice school includes the contributions of Buchanan,
Tolluck and their followers.  The key recognition is  that since policy
choices  (whether in public or private organizations) affect  individual
utility, it  is  rational for individuals  to withdraw resources  from the
production of goods and services and allocate them to lobbying, or  to other
efforts to  gain access to political authority and effect policy choice.
Economic losses can include policy-induced dead weight losses plus the
welfare loss  from the  resources consumed in altering policy.  This focus
shifts  attention to  institutions outside of  the  typical market place concept
and places  it  on legal and illegal activities such as  licensing, tax
avoidance and so  on.  The public choice  school has  touched on a broad range
of  issues, including log rolling and the behavior of bureaucrats  (Tullock,
and Niskanen).
The international  trade and regulation school begins with the seminal
contribution of Krueger and includes Bhagwati, Bhagwati and Srinivasan and
more  recently, Appelbaum and Katz  (1986,  1987) and Young and Magee.  Other
important contributions include Becker and a host of studies  on political
systems and regulation that have recently been reprinted in a volume edited
by Stigler.  Generally speaking, these efforts place emphasis on the
motivation for allocating resources  to unproductive profit seeking  (DUP)
activities, the consequent shrinking of an economy's production
possibilities, and implications to  factor returns and trade.  Examples of
DUP activities are  tariff seeking, tariff evasion, seeking of tariff
revenues, and licenses.
Applebaum and Katz focus  on rent seeking and rent avoidance and later,
on an environment where regulators  of instruments induce rent  seeking.
Young and Magee combine the  approach of Findlay and Wellisz, who studied how
resources contributed by interest groups  affected trade protection, with
that of Mayer's model where trade policy is determined by fully informed
5
voters . Becker investigated the presence of political pressure groups that
3This general  line of reasoning is  also provided by Hayami and Honma,
and Anderson.
4The approach and scope of this  school can be gleamed from the volume
edited by Rowley, Tollison and Tullock.
5Peltsman is  a frequently cited contribution that was among the first toallocated resources to influence central authority to countervail  taxes and
provide  subsidies in their favor.  This structure allows for competition
among groups and, drawing upon Olson, allows for the rising cost of lobbying
by larger groups.  Later we discuss  some of these contributions in the
context of the base model presented below.
III. The Model
In this  section we present a general equilibrium model of an economy
with two distinct parts:  (i)  a small open economy with two households  (rural
and urban),  two goods  (food and non-food),  and two factors,  labor and sector
specific input;  and  (ii)  a government which provides a public good to  each
sector, and sets  the  relative price of the  two  goods in response to  lobbying
by households.
The Household
Households  are indexed by i = r (rural), u  (urban).  Households  choose
levels of food qr  and non-food (qu)  to  consume.  They also choose the
amount of labor  (L  )  allocated to  the production of the  rural good (y  ) and
urban good (y  ); the  amount of land (x  )  and plant and equipment  (x  )  to
u  r  u
rent in or out;  and the  amount of labor  to hire  in or  to work out  side of
the  sector.  They are given endowments  of labor  (Li),  and land and plant and
equipment  (x.).  Market failure  is captured by the presence  of a rural and
1
an  urban  public  good  (Gi)  that  is  supplied by the public  sector.  These
goods may be treated as  roads, electrification,  and other activities which
increase  the productivity of labor.  A departure from this neo-classical
tradition comes about later in the development of the model when households
are allowed to  allocate resources to  influence the  government's choice of
the levels to  set policy instruments.
The household's optimization problem is,  for i - r,u,:
(1)  V.(p,i.)  Max U(qi  ,q ), 1(  1  LR  TT  ui-
i
X  -(q (,q  ,L i  x  )  R  I  H  - pqri 
+  q}"). i  ri  ui'  i  +  i  qi  ui
Disposable income II depends on profits ai  from the  production of the  i-th
good, returns to  the  endowments of labor  (L )  and sector specific factors
(x.),  and proportion 7  of  the tax bill T.  Denote prices by p, w and c  for
the rural good, labor and the sector specific factor, respectively.  The
formulate voting rules in a theory of market regulation.price of the urban good is  taken as numeraire. Then,
(2)  nl  - R(pwcG  )  +  w[L£  - 1] +  c  x  +  7  T
i  i  ii  i
pyi(Li,x  ;G ) +  w(L  - L - l  )  +  c (xi  - x )  +  7 T
S  i  ±  i  i  i  i  i  i  i  i  i
for values  in X  that maximize  (1).
Initially, we treat the household's lobby level 1  as a parameter.  The
i
direct utility U(-)  and production functions yi(.)  are assumed to be
continuous, strictly concave and increasing in the household's choice
variables.  In this  situation, the household's problem is separable
(Jorgenson  and Lau) so  that  it can  be stated in its dual  form, denoted here
by the  "conditional" indirect  functions for utility V (-) and profit wr  ().
These indirect functions are conditional  in the sense that the  rule for
choosing the  lobby level i  remains  to be  determined.
Letting E  denote excess domestic  demand, commodity and factor market
j
balances  are,
(3.a)  2iq  j-  y  j  E  j  =  r, u
(3.b)  - L  - Z  1  - 2 1 8   - 0,
ii  ii  ii  i  i
(3.c)  x  - x  - 0, i  i
for the rural and urban goods,  and for labor and the  sector specific  factors
respectively.  The  2  1  term  in  the  labor  balance  equation  accounts  for  the i  i
amount of labor the  government allocates  to  the production of the rural and
urban  public  goods.
Treating  p  ,  1°,  and  the  government's  policy  instruments  p,  ,1,  1l  as i  r  u
exogenous variables,  (3.b) and (3.c)  are a system of three equations  in the
three variables w, c ,  c . It is  assumed that an equilibrium of the economy
4r  4
exists and is unique.  In this case, let w - w(e ),  and c  - c (e  )  denote _0  1  1i  i  1
the  result, where e-  (p, 0  ,1 0 ,18,1 ,L  ,L ,x ,x ).
1  r  u  r  u  r  u  r  u
The Government
We assume a government that forms preferences over the utility of
households in the economy, and then chooses policy instruments  as though it
sought to  maximize its preferences  subject to  the condition that it cannot
incur a fiscal, and hence a trade, deficit.  The  government's policy
instruments are the relative price p, and the amount of labor I8  to  allocate
to  the production of the rural and urban public goods  (G  ,G  ).  That is,
r  u
government  is  assumed  to  solve(4)  Max  U  - I (p ,p  )V  + I (p  ,p  )V ,  X  - ((p,1',1)  E R }.
g  r  r  u  r  r  u  r  u
Maximization takes place subject  to  the production function for public goods,
(5)  G  - G(1)
and the requirement  that fiscal expenditures
(6)  C  - - wE1'  +  (p  - pW)E ii  r
equal  the lump sum  income transfers  (T) to households,  i.e.,T =  C . We
assume y  is  continuous, quasi-concave  and increasing in 1'.  The values I
are weights that define the  government's preference ordering.  They are
specified as  influence functions whose arguments are determined by the
political pressure  (p.).
1
The  influence functions  represent the end product of pressure generated
by special  interest groups.  Different countries use different methods to
define the  power of the  state.  A fundamental characteristic of virtually
all political systems  is  that they are  subject to pressures  from special
interests.  Hence, we allow households  to lobby for purposes  of generating
political pressure  (p.)  that yields influence I ; i.e.,  households lobby in
1  1
order to  alter the parameters of the government preference  function, and
hence the  choice of instrument  levels  in X  .
This structure  is  very much a "reduced form" approach.  Details  of the
institutions for establishing laws, politicians, political parties,
mechanisms for enacting laws  and defining policy instruments  from a set of
possible  instruments  receive no particular attention.  The basic result is
that policy instruments  can be used to  raise the welfare of  the more
influential groups.  Unlike  the rent seeking literature  in which, absent of
other  distortions in the economy, rent seeking is an activity that reduces
efficiency  (Buchanan), it  is now possible for lobbying to  increase an
economies production possibilities, albeit at a cost of allocting labor from
production to  lobbying activities.
Fiscal effects of trade are  (p - pW)E  - (P /P  - P /Pw)E  +  (P  /P  -
r  r  u  r  u  r  u  u
pW/P )E .
u  u  u
An alternative approach to  individual household lobbying is  to specify a
third sector to  the economy that specializes  in the production of  political
influence  as a function of  the resource cost required to produce it  and the
willingness of the households to  pay these  costs.  This approach would
capture the activities of, for example, law firms that lobby on the behalf
of their clients.  However, this  tends  to  complicate the analysis with out
adding significant insights beyond the approach followed here.Following Becker, political pressure is produced in an environment of
rules and institutions that map lobbying into pressure,  i.e.,  a pressure
production function,
(7.a)  p  - pi(11z ).
Similar to a technology, p  is positive, continuous  and quasi-concave, in
the  amount  of  labor  i  allocated to  lobbying.  For the moment, z is a vector
i  i
of exogenous variables that summarize the  state of the political economy;
they affect the efficiency of converting lobbying into pressure.  This
function represents a political technology, perhaps  one of a set of possible
technologies that are  available  to households to produce political pressure.
The end result of lobbying is a set of weights
(7.b)  I  - I.(p  ,p  ). i  i  r  u
It  follows from the linearity of  (4)  in I  that  it  is  relative changes  in
I.,  and not their absolute magnitudes that matter.  We assume  that relative
1
influence, I - I  /I , is continuous, positive and concave and increasing
(resp. convex and decreasing) in p  (resp. p ).  Since  8 1/ap Qp -
2  2  r  u  r  u
a  I/8p  Qp  ,  if 8 I/ap ap  is positive at p*,  p*, then in the neighborhood of u  r  r  u  r  u
this  point,  an  increase  in  p  increases the marginal product of p  so  that an
increase  in.p  decreases the absolute effect of p  on I . These conditions r  u
imply that an increase  in the political efficiency of the  i-th household,
e.g.,  8p  /8z  >  0, can  decrease  the  relative  influence  of  the  j-th household
and induce the latter to  countervail the  increased efficiency of  i with more
labor allocated to  lobbying, all else constant.
IV. The Government's Decision Rules
For household choices  (q  r,q  UL.,X)  E R+,  the value of the
government's preference function (4) either  (i)  declines beyond some point
p*,  Il*,  I*,  or  (ii)  reaches  an upper bound.  In the case of (i), r  u
further distortions  in the economy lead to an increase in taxes T to the
point where the product of the government's preference weight and the
decline  in the i-th household's utility exceeds  the product of the increase
in the j-th household's utility and the government's preference weight for
this household.  Boundedness of (4)  comes about because of  the government's
budget constraint, i.e.,  it  is not permitted to  obtain free resources  from
the rest of the world.  Since the government  cannot incur a budget deficit,
If the cross derivatives are negative at p*,  p*, then an increase in p
r  u  u
decreases the marginal product of p  on I. r
10the j-th household's income is also bounded from above by the amount of
income  that is possible  to  transfer from the  i-th household.  The bound is
approached when the  i-th household's budget approaches zero.
Proposition 1I  If the Negishi condition holds,  i.e.,  I  - 1/V  , and
w
if E  is non zero, then a maximum to  (4) is  characterized by p - p  and
r,p 9
i  i  G  s il  =  w.  See Appendix for sketch of proof.
i,G  il i  i
Under these conditions,  the government chooses a price that would also
prevail under free trade.  As well, labor is allocated to  the production of
public goods  to  the point where the product of  the marginal value product of
the public good, n . ,  and the marginal physical productivity of labor  in
producing the public, G  i s  in the  i-th sector equals the wage.  If each
i
sector has several agents, G  is  a  pure  public  good  in  the  sector.  In this
case,  under the  conditions  of proposition 1, public goods  supply satisfies
the Sammuelsonian efficiency condition in each sector as well as being
efficiently allocated between sectors.  Hence, by construction, the model
does not preclude a free  trade  - efficient public good result.
For the  case of an interior  solution to  (4),  let the  government's
policy decision rules be  denoted by:
(8.a)  p - p(e ) 2
and
(8.b)  1  -  1i s
i  i  2
S  w  o  o  - - - - 10 where, e  (p,  ,1 ,L  ,L  ,x ,x  ,z  ,z  )
2  r  u  r  u  r  u  r  u
Proposition 2:  If the  tax burden is borne by urban households, 7 -
0, price distortion is determined by:
(p  - p") - (l-I)[(y  - q  )  + (L  - L  )w ]}/E r  rr  r  r  p  r,p
when L  - L >  0, and  L  - L < 0  and by
r  r  u  u
(p-  p)  (-I)[(y  - q  )  - (L  - L )w  ])/E
r  rr  u  u  p  r,p
when  L  - L  < 0,  and  L  - L  >  0, where L  - L  - 1 and I  - I  V  /IV
r  r  u  u  i  i  i  r  r,nI  u  "
u
See Appendix for a sketch of the  proof.
9Unless otherwise  indicated, notation V  denotes  8V /i  .
10Noted that p and I1  are homogeneous  of degree zero  in I . i  i
1111 For the case of a normal good, E  is negative, and w  is positive
r,p  p
The  direction  of price  distortion  depends  on  whether  relative  infulence
favors  rural households, I > 1, and whether households are labor  surplus,
(L  - L )  positive,  or  deficit.  If  infulence  favors  labor  surplus  rural
households  that  produce  a  market  surplus,  (y  - q  )  positive,  then  p  >  pW.
If  the  rural household  produces  a  surplus  and  is  labor  deficit  (hence,
urban  households  supply  surplus  labor  to  the  rural sector  and  to  the
government),  an increase  in domestic price  increases production costs.  The
sign  p  - p  is  indeterminant  in  this  case,  though,  a  labor  deficit  almost
surely  serves  to  decrease  the  level  of  price  distortion.  The  sign  is  also
indeterminant when rural households are deficit producers of  the rural  good,
and  have  a  labor  surplus.
Throughout this  section, virtually identical results  are obtained when
7-  1.  Also, these results  are easily generalized for the case of  two
freely  mobile  factors  of  production,  except  in  this  case,  the  sign  of  w
p
depends on the Stopler Samuelson condition.
Proposition  3:  If  the  tax burden  is  borne  by  urban  households,  7  -
0,  the  difference  in  the  marginal  value  products  of  the  public  good  are
determined  by:
SG G  r  - 1   G  l  - (1  - I)((Lr-  L  )(wls  - wig)  +  G  g,)  - r,G  r,l  u,G  u,i  r  r  1  1  r,G  r,i
r  r  u  u  r  u  r  r
(p  - p  )(E  g  - E  g),
r  u
for  L  - L  >  0,  and  L  - L  <  0,  and
r  r  u  u
G  G  r  - GIr  s  - (I  - )((LU-  L )(wl8  - W)  - r  G  18)  - r,G  r,  u,G  u,  u  u  w1  r,G  r,1 r  r  u  u  r  u  r  r
(p  - p  )(E  g  - E u  g),
r  u
for  L  - L  <  0,  and  L  - L  >  0.  See  Appendix  for  sketch  of proof. r  r  u  u
If  infulence  is  unbiased,  I  - 1,  then  the  marginal  products  equal  wage,
as  shown in proposition 1.  If  infulence favors  rural labor surplus
If,  rather  than  a  Ricardo-Viner  type  of  model,  another  freely  mobil  input
were specified, then the sign of w  would depend on the Stopler-Samuelson
condition.  If  E  positive,  (the  rural is  good  imported)  then  for  normal
goods  E  <  0  (Dixit  and  Norman,  p.  224).  If  E  negative,  the  sign  of  E
r,p  r  r,p
cannot  be  unambiguously  determined.  If  the  income  effect  is  "small"  then
E  is negative, hence the same result  (Woodland,  p.153). r,p
12households, then all else constant, (L - L  )(w l g  - W1 g) positive  will
r  u
encourage the allocation of public goods  to  the  rural relative to  the urban
sector.  The direction of biase in public good allocation in this  case is
determined by the wage effect of labor allocated to  the production of public
goods  in  the  rural  relative  to  the  urban  sector,  i.e.,  (Wlg  - Wig) positive.
r  u
It  can  be  shown  that  (wlg  - wig)  positive  depends  on  the  marginal  product  of
r  u
the  public  good  in  the  production  of  yi  and  the marginal  product  of  labor
used in the production of the  i-th sectors public good, i.e.,
(y r/aG )8G /a  g  > (ay  /8G )8G //al >  0.  In this case,  the rural household
r  u
benefits  from increased productivity from public good allocation and from
the increase in wage income  to  surplus rural labor.  However, if  (wgl  - wig)
r  u
is  negative,  then allocation of the public good to  the urban sector also
benefits  the  rural labor surplus household thus  decreasing the bias in
allocation of the public  good to  the rural sector.  If the rural sector is
labor deficit, then the  converse of these results apply.
The  terms Elg  are the effects  on excess demand from an allocation of
i
labor to  the production of the  i-th public good.  It  enters  the above
expression because allocation of  the public good alters excess demand and
hence taxes.  This  term can be shown to be negative when  G  IG  >  w,
1i  i
otherwise its  sign is  indeterminant.  If the  conditions  from proposition 2
prevail  that yield p >  pW for a labor surplus household, and (E  1 g - E  .g)
r  u
positive, then price  distortion in favor of rural households also induces
the allocation of public goods  to  the rural sector.  Otherwise, price
distortion in favor of the rural sector is not necessarily in the same
direction as  the  "bias" in the allocation of the public good to the sector.
The marginal value product of the public good, wr,G  Gr,1 s ,  appearing on
r  r
the right hand side,  suggests  that if infulence favors  the  rural household,
then, all else constant, an incremental  increase in the productivity of the
rural public good induces  an additional  increment of public good to be
allocated to  the rural sector.  Conversely, if infulence favors  the urban
household, an incremental  increase  in the productivity of the rural public
good induces an allocation of the public goods toward the urban sector.
An important implication of these results  is  that if the marginal
product of labor allocated to  the production of the public goods  is small
relative to the gains to the i-th household from distorting p from  its
13border price, then the government may "prefer" to distort the relative price
rather than investing in public goods  as  a means of transferring income to
households.
V. The Household's Decision Rules
Assuming that the  i-th household takes  the actions  of the j-th
household as  given, correctly perceives the  objective of government,
equation (4),  knows  the political process through which lobbying is
transmitted to  influence, equation  (7) and  (8),  the household, in principle,
can solve the problem  12
(14)  Max V (p,  ), i e R
I
i
subject to  the  government's decision rules  for p and 1s. Substituting the i
policy decision rules into  (14),  and assuming differentiability of p(e ) and
c  (e ), the  FOC for the rural household is:
1  2
(15)  [y  - q ]p  +  [L  - L  - 1 ][w  p  + w  ]  +  1r  G  s   +
r  rr]P  r  r  r  p  1  1  rG  r,1  r,
r  r  r  r  r  r
y  [TpI  + TG G  1  w.
p 1  G  r,l  r,1 r  r  r  r
See the Appendix for this  derivation.
Condition (15)  provides insights  into the  rural household's willingness
to pay, i.e.,  lobby, to  influence policy  in its favor.  Essentially, this
condition is  one of equating the marginal returns from lobbying to marginal
costs.  To ease exposition, suppose  that 7 is either zero or  that the
household is not aware of the  tax implications  of its  lobbying behavior.
Suppose also that p  and  [w p  + w  ]  are positive.
I  p  1 r  r  r
Consider the first term.  If the household produces  in excess of
consumption, (y  - q  )  positive, and  its lobbying efforts result in an
r  rr
increase  in the price of y  relative  to  the urban good (8p/81  positive),
then the household realizes  a gain from lobbying.  This  result has several
implications.  First, it  suggests  that the more  specialized is  the
household, i.e.,  (y  large relative to q  )  the more willing it  is  to
allocate resources to  influence policy.  Second, the availability of a
cost-reducing technology  (e.g.,  an increase G ) also tends to increase the
r
household's willingness to  influence policy.  Effectively, a cost-reducing
technology tends  to  increase  the household's market surplus and thus the
121f can be shown from the envelope theorem that to constrain the choice of
i  to  the household's budget constraint is redundant. i
14returns to a marginal increase  in the resources allocated to  lobbying.
When the rural good (food) is an important component of household
expenditures, the marginal cost of a price increase,  given by the product
- q  ap/al  , implies an increase  in expenditures on food.  Hence, the
willingness to lobby for an increase in the price food is  lowered in this
case.  This result  is consistent with the observation that in countries
where food accounts  for a relatively large  share of disposable  income,
political pressures tend to  favor cheap food policies.  Typically, in the
process of development, market surplus increases while the proportion of
income spent on food decreases.  Then, rural households are more willing to
influence policy that favors  the  rural good.  In this  case, Urban households
tend to be  less willing to  influence  food policy since less  of their income
will be affected by the  lobby resources allocated for this purpose.  Hence,
this  result is  consistent with the observation that in developed countries,
where food is  a small component of expenditures  and y  is  large, pressures
tend to  favor policies  that subsidize food production.
The  rural household's net labor position is given by  (L  - L-  1 ).  A
negative net labor position contributes  to  the household's preference for a
cheap wage policy.  Households with a small endowment of the sector specific
factor would likely be  labor surplus,  and hence they, along with labor
surplus urban households, would tend to prefer policies which increase real
wages.  Of course, an increase in wages due  to higher rural good prices
presents urban labor surplus households with a trade-off between increased
expenditures on rural goods and higher wage income.
The marginal value product of  the public good,  rrC~  Gr 18, can be
r  r
viewed as  the  "social good" side  of the  lobbying process.  The more
efficient is  the government in producing the public good, and the more
important  is  the public good to  increasing the production of y ,  the more
willing is  the  rural household to  lobby.  Whether the government responds by
increasing the supply of  the rural public good, however, or  increasing
output price, all else constant, depends  on proposition 3.  Still, as this
proposition suggests, when infulence favors  rural households, public good
allocation to  the rural sector is  enhanced for larger values of irG  Gr,1s
r  r
Note that the marginal product of the public good also depends on the
household's endowment of the  sector specific factor x . Thus,  the value of
economic policy gets built into  the value of these factors.  Had the model
accounted for a skewed distribution of  the sector specific factors among
15households, then the willingness  to lobby for polices that  increase the
rents to  these factors would depend, in part, on whether a household  is a
surplus or deficit user of the factor.  In the context of economic growth
and capital accumulation, policies which distort the value of sector
specific assets are  likely to alter a country's growth path.
Wage  (w) is  the opportunity cost of the labor allocated to  lobbying.
An increase  in output price will tend to  increase wages.  This is  the
typical rent seeking result  (Bhagwati, Srinivasan) that the  allocation of
resources  to  influence prices, and away from the production of public goods,
can decrease a country's production possibilities.  Further, these results
suggest that factor market imperfections that lower w, such as  imperfect
labor mobility between the  rural and urban sectors, will affect the
willingness to  lobby.
The efficiency with which lobbying activity is  converted into influence
is revealed by the  partial derivatives p  and ls   in  (15).  If
i  i,l1
i  i
occupation, age, or other changes  increase the efficiency of converting
2
lobbying  into pressure i.e.,  a  p./aliaz  > 0,(or the changes  in the
efficiency of converting pressure  into  influence),  then it can be shown
that, all else constant, an increase in z  can yield an increase  in the
household's lobby level since a  p/ai az  >  0, and  a21  /ai 8z  > 0 depending
r  r  r  r  r
on propositions 2 and 3.
VI. The Game Component of  the Model
In the previous  discussion, the  i-th household chose its  lobbying level
assuming a fixed lobbying level of the j-th household.  The households'
commodity and factor demands are conditional on these fixed lobbying levels.
In addition, the government's decisions regarding relative prices and public
good provision, as  specified in (8.a) and  (8.b),  depended upon the parameter
vector e  , which included these fixed levels.  In this section, we consider
how lobbying levels might be jointly determined.
The  modeling  of  lobbying  itself naturally  is  approached using game
theory.  This  simple statement immediately reveals  the complexity involved
in this effort,  since a very wide variety of game-theoretic approaches is
available, each of which makes  some sense in the current context.
The most straight forward model has three agents:  the government and
the two households  in the economy.  Care must be given to  the usual
interpretation of the households  in the two sectors  as  "representative" of
larger numbers of agents in this context, as we discuss  in more detail
16below.  The government acts as  "nature" and sets,  exogenously, and
once-and-for-all, the decision rules specified as functions of lobbying
according to  (8).  The households  take these  as  given, and then play a
noncooperative  game against one another.  It is  important to note that the
decision rules  in  (8)  actually are a kind of  "reduced form" for the more
elaborate  institutional setting defined by  (7.a) and (7.b);  from the
game-theoretic perspective, it  is more natural  to  focus  on (8).
The simplest approach at this  level  is  to posit a one-shot  game, with
Nash behavior, and to search for Nash equilibria in lobbying  levels.  Even
with this simple setup,  the existence of  a Nash equilibrium  is not trivial;
for more on this  issue see Coggins  et al.
Assuming strict concavity of  (14) in ii,  let
(16.a)  1  - 1i(e  )
denote the  household's lobbying rule obtained from  (15),  where  e  -
i
W  0  - - -
(p, 1°,L  ,L  ,X  ,X ,Z  ,Z  ).  Equation (16.a) is  the  i-th household's best
j  r  u  r  u  r  u
response to the  j-th household's action.  Then 10  are a Nash solution if,
i
and only if,
(16.b)  av /a  - ,  8av /a1   - 0. r  r1i  (e )  u ul  (e  ) u  u  r  r
Of course, there need not be  a Nash solution to  this  game,  and if there  is,
it need not be unique.  Suppose, however, that a Nash solution exists.  Then
we can state  (16.a) as
(16.c)  i - i (e ) i  i  3
where e  =  (p ,L ,L ,x ,x ,z ,z ).  Substituting  for  i  in the government's
3  r  u  r  u  r  u  i
policy decision rules yields:
(17.a)  p - p(e )
3
and
(17.b)  I'  - i( e  ). i  i  3
Hence, both the lobby and policy decision rules are functions of variables
exogenous to both households and the  government.  Condition (16.b)  is  also
the  definition of equilibrium.  If  (16.b) does not hold, then it  is possible
for the i-th household to  reallocate  lobbying resources  to  countervail the
lobbying efforts of the  j-th household, which then responds accordingly.  In
so  doing, the households also change their level of choices  (q  ,q  ,L  ,x  ).
Of course, it  is  not necessarily the case that Nash behavior  is most
natural here.  An alternative would replace the Nash assumption with
reaction functions such that an increase  in lobbying by one agent directly
17would call forth a change in lobbying by the other  (either an increase or a
decrease).  The natural equilibrium concept for this game  is a consistent
conjectures equilibrium (Breshnahan).  In some cases, the partial
derivatives in  (16.b) can be replaced by total derivatives, but in other
cases, more complex restrictions need to be placed on the reaction functions
if  equilibria  are  to exist.
Within the static context,  it is natural  to consider next the way in
which the government can be brought into  the  game.  The government may
recognize that the  agents in the economy respond in their lobbying to
alternative forms of the decision rules  in (8).  Moreover, the government
may have its  own preferences over these outcomes.  The form that these
preferences may take  is discussed in the public choice literature.  For
example, the  government may act benevolently in its choice of  (8)so as  to
mitigate  any potential negative welfare effects  of lobbying, or it may act
to  increase its  influence  (the Leviathan postulate) via its  choices.  Note
that this  discussion concerns  the  functions  in  (7),  and hence the  functions
in  (8),  and not the specific level of I which defines  the government
preferences over agents for  any given level of lobbying.
The previous paragraph posited that the  government  acted as a
Stackleberg leader, able  to  announce the decision rules  (8)  as  its
"strategy,"  and then act to  sustain the economic  outcome after households
lobbying levels are chosen.  In the next level of complexity within the
class of static games,  there exists a direct feedback mechanism from the
households to the government  decision rule.  An example of such a feedback
mechanism is a voting structure,  such that the announced decision rules
serve as  "platforms" in elections among competing governments. Or, one might
think that the agents in the  economy could overthrow the announced decision
rule if it treated them sufficiently badly, thereby limiting the scope of
choice of decision rules by the government.  These considerations concern an
expansion of the strategy space for households  in the economy, and/or an
alternative view of the institutions defined by  (7).  We briefly address
this issue for the case of voting in the next section.
One of the concerns that would have  to be addressed in all of these
static game-theoretic treatments of lobbying is how the households and the
government are able to  find an equilibrium in circumstances  in which it is
not unique. As well, there are other natural absences of information that
should be confronted in this portion of the model.
All of the foregoing discussion was directed to  static models.  Of
18course, it  is more  "realistic"  to assume that the agents know that they are
playing a dynamic game. As  is well known, the move to dynamic  games will
have  important consequences for the outcomes under the model.  For example,
let us  revert momentarily to  the case  in which the  government acts as nature
and sets  the decision rules in  (8)  once-and-for-all.  Suppose further that
these functions define a Prisoner's Dilemma for  the households.  In a static
world, the dominant strategy  (Nash)equilibrium yields  a non-efficient
outcome  for the  game.  However, if the agents recognize that play will
repeat indefinitely, they may achieve a cooperative  outcome.
Similarly, in a dynamic setting, it may be  reasonable to  invoke
alternative equilibrium concepts  that rule out certain Nash equilibria.  For
example, with multiple Nash equilibria, some equilibria may involve
non-credible threats,  and one might appeal to  the notion of subgame
perfection  (Selten).  The dynamic setting similarly would enrich the more
complex static games discussed above which incorporate government behavior
and institutions.  Clearly, it  is beyond the  scope of  this paper to explore
the numerous  ramifications of alternative  game forms for the basic model
elaborated above.  Suffice  it  to say here  that investigation of  the
relationship between the  institutions  in  (7) and the strategies  in  (8),  and
of the nature of the  game defined between the households and  the government,
provides  a very rich source  for further research.
VII. Extensions:  Relation To Selected Literature
This  section focuses on foreign trade, voting, bureaucracy, coalitions
and  the  free rider problem, and endogenous economic growth.  The  intent is
to  tie selected other  issues that have been addressed in the  political
economy  literature mentioned to models  of this  type and to  suggest  the
nature of  the insights  that result.
Foreign Trade
Extending the concept of rent seeking to  foreign trade raises  the  types of
game theory questions mentioned above to  trade relations among nations.  To
see this,  note that the net trade condition  (3.a) for the case of K
countries becomes:
ki  qi(p  (e)  n  ))  - y(e))  - 0, i,j  - u,r.
where the  term in  ({)  is the  k-th country's excess demand for  the j-th
commodity.  If markets clear at relative world price p ,  then, assuming
. w  w-1 ->2  . K
monotinicity, relative world price p  -=  (e ,e ,***,e  ),  is,  potentially, p*~2. 2  2  .Z  s  ptnily
determined  by  lobbying  (ik  , 1 ) in each of k countries.  We briefly mention r  u
19three  implications of rent seeking in the  context of the the Uruguay round of
the GATT negotiations.
Trade negotiations can be viewed as  an effort by governments to  search
for a treaty that will leave the k-th country no worse off,  in terms of  (4),
than in the current state.  Equation (4) defines  the k-th country's payoff
to  treaty outcomes.  Hence, studies,  (such as Harrison et al)  that
investigate possible  outcomes using net social gains as  the payoff are
likely to be misleading, since the estimated gains need to be weighted by
the relative influence of the  interest groups  represented in (4).  The paper
by Johnson et al.  illustrates  this point.  Using the policy instrument set
common to  the US  and the  EEC's 1986 agricultural policies and estimates of
the preference weights  in  (4),  they found that the 1986  program was a Nash
equilibrium.  When the  instrument set was  changed to allow for decoupled
payments to  those interest  groups with the  largest political  influence, a
Nash equilibrium for liberalized trade  resulted, free trade did not.
A second implication is  that  if a treaty under GATT is  to be sustained
by the body politic, then trade negotiations need to  take into account the
reaction functions  (16.a) of  special interest reaction groups in the home
and other large trading countries.  This point was made by Paarlberg (p. 255)
when he criticized those recommending a U.S. negotiation position that
advocated free trade as being too ideological with the result that
**"liberal-minded agricultural policy makers are currently lavishing their
scarce policy resources on the improbable option of a "coordinated"
liberalization through GATT."
A third implication is that a coalition may form among, for instance,
agricultural interests  in the large  exporting countries.  Interest group r
in countries k and k* lobby with knowledge of the others reaction functions
(16.a).  The  coalition can be viewed as a leader in a Stackelberg game with
a possible  result that negotiations result in illiberal trade.  Paarlberg
(p. 180) also noted this  tendency when he remarked that  "When the
international "coordination" of OECD agricultural policies  takes place under
such circumstances,**  (i.e.,  the presence of rent-seeking groups).*,  the
illiberal tendencies  in those  individual policies can be strengthened rather
than weakened."
Voting
A pervasive issue  is how various political process serve to  aggregate
individual preferences.  Since Arrow showed that a majority rule social
20welfare function has  the undesirable property of being intransitive,
numerous others have found that voting outcomes are  largely dependent on the
conditions or rules under which voting takes place.  For  instance, Black
showed that simple majority voting as a means of reconciling differing
individual preferences will produce continual cycling  so  that outcomes
depend on where  the cycling stops.  Riker,  in response  to Downs model of
vote maximizing political parties, argued convincingly that parties  seek
only sufficient votes  to  ensure minimally winning coalitions.  Still others
have shown that in the  presence of limited and costly information, it  is not
worthwhile for voters to become well informed on most issues or even to vote,
and that elections artificially skew decision-making in favor of programs
with  obvious  benefits  but  no  so  obvious  costs.  Empirical evidence  on
voting behavior also yields  counter intuitive results.  For example,
Pletzmen finds  either no  connection or a perverse connection between the
interests of constituents and the votes of their senators.
Hence, models of voting behavior are only likely to provide general
insights  into  questions of special interest group influence over economic
policy.  In this  spirit, we briefly review the  approach taken by Young and
Magee  and then suggest an approach of our own.
Young and Magee consider two lobby groups,  two political parties,  two
goods and two  factors.  The  two political parties align with their
respective capital and labor constituencies  and set trade taxes  (subsidies)
which, through the Stopler-Samuelson affect, benefit capitalists  (labor)
because it  increases  (decreases) the relative price of the capital  (labor)
intensive good.  Effectively, this  approach replaces equations  (4),  (7.a)
and (7.b) by a voting mechanism which posits  that the pro-capital party's
odds of victory are determined by an exogenously given log linear function
log{(/(l-w))}  e + K log K  - A  log L  - a log S + r log T
where unit values are assumed for the parameters n,A,a,r,  e is  set to  zero
and K, L, S and T denote subsidy and tax on the domestic price of the labor
and capital intensive good, respectively.  Capitalists  (labor) allocate a
portion of their capital, K  (labor, L) endowment to  their respective party.
In turn, the  pro capital  (pro labor) party sets  the  subsidy  (tax) to
maximize its  probability i  (1-w) of being elected and hence, through
13See John Ray for a discussion of empirical findings  that special interests
prefer trade protection supported by policy instruments whose costs are not
easily discernible.
21Stopler-Samuelson, augment  (decrease) the  income of capitalists  (labor).
Each party leads one lobby in a Stackelberg fashion, but adopts Nash
behavior towards  the other two players while each lobby adopts Nash behavior
towards  the other three players.  Conditions are derived for an interior
solution to  the game.
The model  is  driven by factor endowments.  As  in the case of the model
presented here, key results  include  (i) factor endowments are  important
determinants of agent's willingness  to expend resources  to  influence policy
outcomes,  (ii)  an increase in a sector's endowment raises its  average rate of
return since it increases the willingness of the  sector to  expend more
resources  to  influence policy,  (iii)  all  groups  can be made worse off when
account  is  taken of the  resources absorbed by the political activity
bringing about  the distortion, and (iv) changes  in technical and taste
parameters  that make factor returns more sensitive  to the politically
manipulated prices, induce  less extreme choices  in prices.  However, agent's
are willing to  expend more resources to  influence policy outcomes.
We now sketch how the model presented here can be modified to  include
the presence of political parties and how this affects  the willingness to
lobby.  From equation (4),  let Um  denote  the preference  function of the m-th
8
party which posses  influence functions  Im,  i.e.,  each party is endowed with
a different influence  function.  Let n  denote the number of rural and urban i
households, i - r,u.  Following Nash behavior, each household is  assumed to
solve  (14)  for the case of each party, and then to vote for that party for
which its utility is  the largest.  Effectively, the m-th party's "platform"
is defined by the policy rules such as  those in  (8).  The party receiving
the largest number of votes becomes  the party that maximizes  (4) to
determine the policy rules realized.
While a number of outcomes are possible, an interesting outcome that
seems  consistent with observation is  that by voting, the masses limit the
ability of the otherwise powerful lobby groups to  influence policy outcomes.
That is,  the masses can limit the willingness of those who can alter the
influence I"  of the m'-th party with relatively few resources because,
depending on the number of voters n  relative to n , the m' party can be
eliminated from power thereby leaving an In that is  less responsive
i
(productive) to the loosing group.  Effectively, the rural masses bound the
lobbying power of the urban elite.
4Since  the parameters of the influence functions reflect the underlying
22Bureaucracy
In the presence of market failure, a common view is  that government is
the appropriate agent for taking corrective measures  to  attain Pareto
superior outcomes.  Tullock focusing on the  rewards and penalties  facing a
bureaucrat located in a hierarchy, concluded that bureaucrats seek to  expand
the  size of their bureaus, since salary and other perquisites  of office are
related to  the  size of the budgets they administer and control.  Niskanen's
model  of a budget maximizing bureaucracy showed that a bureaucracy could
succeed in expanding budgets to  a point where  tax payers were no better off
than they would be in the absence  of the public good.  Casting  the spirit of
Niskanen's  approach into a general equilibrium framework provides broader
insights  than he was able  to  provide.
In the context of our model, we sketch how the behavior of bureaucrats
can be  introduced.  Presently, the government chooses  the instruments  p, I,
r
and lI  without a bureaucracy to  implement them.  Bureaucrats are defined as
U
a third  interest group whose  conditional  indirect utility V (p,n ), pressure
g&
p (1  ,z  ) and influence I (p  ,p ,p  ) functions  correspond to  (1),  (7.a) and
g  g  8  8  r  u  g
(7.b) respectively.  In the  spirit of Niskanen, the bureaucrat implements
and manages  the government's policy instruments  in exchange for a budget b
to  perform this service, where the  size of the budget has a positive  effect
on the bureaucrat's income.  The budget, exclusive of labor costs, is  a
function of the  level  of the policy instruments,
b  - b(p  - pW  ,1,19).
9  r  u
Budget costs are a monotonicaly convex and increasing function of the
wedge between domestic and world prices,  (p - pW) I  and the amount of labor
Il  allocated to  the production of public goods.  Labor required to implement
and manage policy is  given by the bureaucrat's  labor endowment  L  plus  labor
8
obtained from the labor market, ZL  . The bureaucrat's income is
± gi
I  - r (b  )  + WL
8  8  8  8
where w b  > 0 indicates that the  size of  the budget has a positive  impact
8
on this group's  income.  The bureaucrat faces an advantage  in that no loss
in wage income occurs from time allocated to  lobbying since lobbying occurs
while employed.  Another advantage may by be  that less lobbying time  is
required to obtain influence relative to other households.  Equations  (3),
structure of a country's legal structure,  incentives exist for  the powerful
to  attempt to  alter this  structure in order to  circumvent this outcome.
23(4)  and  (6)  also  need  to  be  modified  to  reflect  the  addition  of  a  third
sector to  the economy.
The key result of this modification is  the possibility for a coalition
to  form between bureaucrats and either rural or urban households.  For
instance,  it  can be shown that if the gain to  the bureaucrat's income from
an increase  in the wedge between domestic and world price, Hl(  wpp  )l, is
large  relative to  gains from the production of public goods, I  HI,  and w
is negative, then bureaucrats will lobby for p - p'  < 0.  This policy can be
in the interests  of urban households.  Hence,  the urban household may be
able to  obtain what was not otherwise obtainable  in the absence of
bureaucrats.  Effectively, urban households  form a coalition with
bureaucrats in a noncooperative game with rural households.
As  in the  case of Niskanen, another parameterization of the model can
yield the  result that bureaucrats will tend to  lobby for the  production of
public goods G  to the point where their provision can leave households no
better off than with some  initial endowment of public goods  so  that
7 i  G  8 l  <  w, i - r,u.  The production possibilities for the economy can i,G  i,  1
i  i
also be reduced as more labor  is  drawn into  the production of bureaucratic
services.
Coalitions  and The Free Rider Problem
Olson noted that even though agents have some  interests  in common and
can be expected to  lobby for their interest,  in the absence of special
arrangements, rational individuals will not act  in the  groups interest.
Services of a lobby are  like a public good, their provision to  anyone in the
group means provision to everyone.  Consequently, there are incentives  for
individuals  to free ride.  In spite  of incentives to  free ride, lobbies
exits.  The key to overcoming the  free rider problem lies  in the ability of
an organization to  institute a set of selective incentives  to individuals
depending on whether they contribute  to  the provision of the  collective
good.
This  reasoning in the context of our model is  that a narrowly based
coalition would prefer to lobby to  seek their differential advantage through
price policy in contrast to  expenditures on the public good G . As we
noted, in the presence of market failure, lobbying can, in principle, expand
15Structuring incentives  and the free rider problem are  typically dealt with
in the theory of organizational design (see Marschak).
24societies  output.
Adapting our approach to  include  organizational design is beyond our
scope.  Instead, we extend the approach of Becker.  Becker models the end
result of the design problem by defining pressure functions  (7.a).  These
functions are modified as  follows:
p  - p  (ni  ,n  ,z i )  - p (1 ,  n.z )
Si  i  ii  i  i  i  i  i  i
where n  is  the number of households in the  sector and 1  is  the  total labor ±  i
allocated to  lobbying by the  sector.  The effect of the  free rider problem
on the  level of lobbying required to generate  pressure is
2  2  2  2 a  Pi/a818n  - (a pi(nil.1,n  ,zi)/8i  )ni  +  8  p i ( n  Ii ,n  ,z i ) / 8 1 n )ia
where  the sign of the  first term is determined by whether there are
increasing or decreasing returns  to  scale in lobbying, and the second is
assumed negative because  of free  riding.  Effectively, free riding increases
the  cost of producing pressure  as  the number of households n  in the  i-th
sector increase.  Parametric changes  in z  capture the ability of  the
lobbying organization to  institute a set of selective incentives to
individuals  depending on whether  they contribute  to  the provision of the
collective good, i.e.,  allocate labor to  lobbying.  An alternative  approach
is mentioned in footnot eight.
As mentioned, agent's willingness to  lobby is determined from  (15),
where, with single sector households, differences  in sector specific
endowments x  have no effect on the agent's lobbying level.  However, if
sector specific endowments  are not evenly distributed among the n
i
households, i.e.,  there exist farms and factories of different sizes,  then,
aside from free riding, lobbying levels will vary among households in the
sector since, for each j-th household in the  i-th sector, the  term
(x  - x  )(c  p  + c  ,lI  )  enters  (15)17.  Households for which  (x  - i  i  i,  1P  i  i1  1  "  i
i  i  i
x  ) is positive will be motivated to allocate a different level of labor to
lobbying  than will households where this  term is negative.  Hence, total
lobby level  "i  depends on the distribution of endowments as well as  the
number of households in the sector.  Moreover, if households held some of
16 Using an overlapping generations model, Prescott and Boyd derive  this
result for a special case.
17The pressure function now becomes  p  - p (21 ,n ,z).  Hence,  the
derivative, ap/al..,  implyies that each agent perceives  its contribution to
altering policy.
25their wealth in the other sector's sector specific factors  (as could be  the
case in the presence of capital markets),  then they would be less likely to
allocate as many resources  to  influence their otherwise more narrow
interests.
Economic Growth
Lucas and others  (Romer, Borrow) have investigated the possibility that
the level and rates of the disparate growth in per capita income among the
world's  economies lies  in how society, acting collectively, addresses
problems of market failure attributed to externalities,  learning and public
goods.  In this  context, it appears possible  that efforts of individuals  or
groups  to  seek their differential  advantage lead to  government interventions
that distort market signals,  induce  an inefficient allocation of resources
in the private  sector, as well  as under  investment in areas where markets
otherwise function poorly to  optimally allocate society's resources.
The static framework presented here only offers a glimpse  into this
important question.  To address  these issues necessarily requires a growth
model, perhaps along the  lines of Borrow, with additions that depict the
rational behavior of agents  to allocate resources to  influence policy in
their favor.  Our static framework suggests  that lobbying can, in principle,
expand a country's production possibilities beyond what they would be in the
absence of lobbying.  The model  also suggests that growth and agent's
willingness to allocate resources  to  seek their differential advantage are
almost surely path dependent.  For instance, the  shadow prices of the sector
specific endowments  xi are functions  of the government's policy instruments.
In a dynamic model, wealth is  embodied in these endowments,  and a sector's
capacity to participate in capital markets and to invest depends on the
value of these endowments.  Moreover, the presence of a policy threat,
e.g.,  to  alter policy in a way that lowers  the value of the endowment, may
induce households to  lobby at levels much higher than in the absence of a
threat.  Effectively, the value of the protection offered by policy gets
built into the value of sector specific assets.  Hence, once a country is
launched on a path where policy affects the value of endowments, a
constituency may form to maintain the policy, since otherwise a  decline in
wealth could result.
As  the value of protection gets  built into  the value of sector specific
assets, so to may the value of protection get built into political assets.
Political  scientists have focused considerable attention on the path
26dependency of policy.
1s  In the  context of our static model, the exogenous
variables z  in the pressure and influence  functions can be viewed as
quasi-fixed factors  that reflect  the capital embodied in organizational
structures  through which lobbying is managed, and the institutional change
(e.g.,  congressional committees) brought about by laws  that define, legalize
and guide the use  of policy instruments and so  on.  How these institutional
changes might be depicted in a dynamic framework is  a challenge for future
efforts.
VIII.  Summary Remarks
This paper sought to provide some  of insight  into  the  general area of
political  economy.  This  task is  complicated by the need to  integrate the
contributions from a number of  schools of thought.  At the  same time,  the
strength of addressing these  issues broadens  the domain of questions  and
insights  that traditional  economic approaches  cannot discern;  issues  that
are fundamental to questions of economic  growth, distributive justice, and
the  economic relations among nations.  The formal modeling of political
economy "layers"  another level of complexity over the  functioning of
markets,  a "layer" of complexity that may be  even more cultural  and region /
nation specific than market behavior alone.  Hence, returning to  the view of
Aumann, formal constructs  of political economy may need to be judged on the
basis  of whether they provide useful  insights as  opposed to whether they are
true  or false.
Nevertheless, political economy constructs  are almost certain to
share a number of structural elements  in common.  Since a subsidy to  one
sector of an economy is  almost always  an implicit  tax to another, models of
this  type will almost surely need to be multi-market if not general
equilibrium in nature.  Second, since resources are required to  generate
economic policy, the behavioral structure within which they are  allocated
will  almost surely need to be  specified.  Third, the problem of how a
political process  serves  to aggregate individual preferences will need to be
modeled.  Our approach was  to posit the end result of  a process  that gave
rise  to  a government forming preferences over the utility of agents  in the
economy where the parameters of  these preferences  are influenced by the
willingness of agents in the economy to  expend resources in terms of
lobbying and other political activity.  The selection among possible
18See for example Goldstein.
27preference functions could come about through voting.  Clearly, the last two
properties of political economy models are dependent on institutional
structures  that guide this process and that themselves are evolving over
time.  Hence, we return to the value of institutional knowledge and the
contributions of studies of the  role of institutions and their evolution in
explaining economic phenomena.
While the  insights provide by these frameworks my verge on the
qualitative relative to  traditional approaches,  they nevertheless  suggest a
number of quantitative approaches.  For  instance, equations  (8.a) and (8.b)
are candidates for fitting to  time  series data and then, using an
endogeneity test,  test the null hypothesis of whether the data  supports the
presence of a Nash equilibrium in the formation of economic policy.
Clearly, care must be taken in estimating the weights of a government's
preference function since they are endogenously determined.  Methods  to
measure a household's willingness to pay to  influence economic policy is
suggested by  (15).  Another approach is  to cast  the type of structure
developed here into a computable general equilibrium framework.19
Nevertheless, achieving empirical measures of political phenomena presents  a
real challenge, since many of the resources allocated to  generate political
outcomes, and the role which political tactics and strategies play in
eventual outcomes, are complex and often not observable to  the analyst.
1 9This approach is  illustrated by Roe and Yeldan.
28APPENDIX
SKETCH OF PROOF TO PROPOSITION 1:
Preliminaries:  The first order conditions  to  (4) simplify to:
aZ/8p - I [V  [- q  +y  -L  Lw  - xc  + w  L  +  c  x  +
r  r,l  rr  r  r p  r r,p  p  r  r,p r
r
(10.a)  y[-  w Xl + E  + (p  - p)E  ]]]  + p i  i  r  r,p
I [V  [- q  - LW  - XC  +w  L  +  c  x  +
u  u,H  ru  up  u  u,p  P  u  u,p u
u
(1-7)  [-  w  .1  + E+(p - p)E  ]]]  - 0
p i i  r  r,p
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r  r  r  r  r  r  r
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for an interior solution when use is made of the  following relatic
V  =  - V  q  .;  7r  y  ;  x  =  - L ;  and  =-  x  .
j,p  j,H  rj  r,p  r  i,W  i,C.  i
r  i
Proof:If the Negishi condition holds,  i.e.,  I  - 1/V  then
simplifying  (10)  yields:





aZ/al 8  - X  G  g  - w  +  (p  - pw)E  l  - 0,
r  r,  r,  r,
r  r  r
aZ/a1  - ?  Glg  - w  +  (p  - pw)E  g  - 0.
u  u  u  u
U  U  U
Hence, if E  is non-zero,  then proposition 1 follows. r,p
SKETCH  OF  PROOF FOR  PROPOSITION  2
Let  I  - I  V  /IV  . Note  that household  and  labor  market
U r  r, 1I/  u u, 11"
u
identities  imply,  for  case  a:  if  L  - L  >  0,  L  - L  <  0  then  1gr  - 2  1
r  r  u  u  i i
and  for  case  b:  if  L  - L  <  0,  L  - L  >  0  then  1iU  - 2 .  1,  where  Ig
1
r  r  u  u  i  i
29denotes the amount of labor allocated
household, i - u, r.  Using  (3.a) and
Case a:
to  government employment by the  i-th
(3.c),  we obtain from condition (10.a),
(11.a)  8Z/8p - [I  - l][(y  - q)  +  (  - L  )w  ]  +  (p  - pW)E r  rr  r  r  p  r,p
Case  b:
(1l.b)  a/ap  - [I  - l][(y  - q)  - (L  - L  )w]  +  (p  - p  )E
r   rr  u  u  p  r,p
Rearranging  yields  proposition  2.
SKETCH  OF  PROOF FOR  PROPOSITION 3
Using  (3.a)  and  (3.c),  we  obtain
Case a:
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r
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If both households have a labor surplus, then  L  - L - 1i.  Subtracting
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